vortex (vor' teks) n.
1. A spiral motion of fluid within a limited area.
2. A place or situation regarded as drawing into its center all that surrounds it.
Showing posts with label European banks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label European banks. Show all posts

Friday, November 25, 2011

Merkel vs Eurozone: Ms Lagarde (IMF) Enters

Structural Flaws of the Euro Exposed



The Euro experiment cannot continue in its current form, period. Fiscal harmony only works when the net export and fiscal equations are also harmonized. Since it is too late for that to be established, we are now back to old-school economics. Countries need to have individualized foreign exchange capabilities. Greece, Italy, and Spain need to devalue their domestic currencies dramatically to pay for their debts. Oops, there is no such thing as a domestic currency. We can dance around the different topics, but absent debt write-off, and simultaneous governmental intervention to prevent an all-out European banking crisis, the Euro experiment is entering its final stages.

Liquidity? Nope. Solvency is the Problem.
The headline is that European bank liquidity has dissolved. The actual problem is that the cause of this is that solvency of European banks is the question. The Merkozy debate is really about how to solve the solvency issue because without a solution, a liquidity solution is nowhere to be found. We will be able to figure out who the survivors will be at a later date; for those currently long European bank equities, the answer is that no one will be left unscathed.

Germany is Pathetic For Many Reasons
Without the PIIGS, you could say that the Euro or Mark vs the USD should be much, much higher. If that were the case, then the German economy would be in a world of hurt. If anything, Germany has benefited from the weak Euro the most; Siemens, BMW, et al have all made money that would have gone to their global competition if the Euro didn't have these problems. For Germany to now turn around and behave in a holier-than-thou way is pathetic at best. Chancellor Merkel is playing a dangerous game, because responding to internal German politics will result in a much weaker German economy in the medium term, and potentially in the very short term if the European economy implodes. However, Chancellor Merkel holds all the cards at the moment, and whether she is bluffing or just stupid is irrelevant. She holds all the cards and needs to get all the concessions she can, while she can. However, Germany, and thus Europe, cannot solve this problem by itself.

Dear IMF: Require Sales of Gold to Help Solve
The IMF is required to solve this multi-faceted Prisoner's Dilemma exercise. The IMF purchases out the individual country, after securing all the gold reserves of that country. Period. Absent that, let the ECB flail around. Although it was widely criticized, the IMF put itself in this position when dealing with the Asian currency crisis. Some believe that the IMF created more problems than it solved. That is Monday-morning quarterbacking at is worst. Individual countries dramatically devalued their currency, took the austerity measures under IMF auspices, the population worked its collective ass off, the debts were repaid early, and growth resumed. That is the ONLY blueprint that now remains. Delaying acceptance of this is making it worse. Much, much worse.

Update (Nov 27): Sacre bleu! Ms Lagarde and IMF Right on Cue


The is no shortcut around a problem the size of Italy. This blog has suggested that the PIIGS be required to put up their family silverware (gold to be precise) to partially collateralize further rescue efforts. It has taken a month and a half (of time that we did not have) for these developments suggested here. The naysayers will look at the IMF plan/rumor and start throwing bombs at it; to which I say that TARP and POMO did what they were supposed to do, which is to avoid imminent depression, and allow the banking system heal. From that point, the economy could find a path back from the brink.

The objectives of TARP and POMO were achieved; the U.S. avoided instantaneous depression. That the banking system didn't use the steep yield curve along with much harsher government measures attached to TARP, is on someone else. Not the programs themselves. When you apply that analogy here, the IMF shouldn't be ignored.

Friday, September 16, 2011

75% Agree to Greece Bailout: Welcome to Multi-Party Prisoners' Dilemma

Only 75%? Are You Kidding Me?
According to CNBC (take that with a grain of salt), 75% of private sector banks have agreed to the Greek bailout. Many people have heard of the simulation called the Prisoners' Dilemma. For those who haven't, an explanation is here. If you Google "prisoners dilemma," you will find many academic papers describing it, as well as simulations that predict the most favorable outcomes.
The problem with that analysis is that it presumes multiple interactions, where you have the experiment over and over. However, in the case of Greece bailout, this is not necessarily the case.

What Does This Mean?
To agree means taking a haircut, maturity extension, etc of existing Greek debt. If anything, what you probably have is that 25%, who dissented, have not properly marked their Greek debt holdings to market. Acceptance of the Greek bailout will crystallize these losses. The French banks (Soc Gen, BNP) have seen their equity prices decline, and their credit ratings cut as a result of the instability caused due to suspicions that they have too much Greek debt. Who knows if this is true, but it is clear that the banking system has restricted funding to French banks due this suspicion. It is now also clear that the ECB and the Federal Reserve, along with other central banks, have basically turned the faucet to "full on" in order to provide the financial system with dollar liquidity. Also clear: these central banks knew full well that the acceptance rate was much lower than the 90% required for the bailout.

Dissent also implies that these banks believe that their survival is at stake, or that they believe that the ECB et al will cave, and provide the bailout in any case. If the bailout is not granted, then the dissenting banks must believe that they will not survive. Otherwise, they would have agreed to the terms as they were originally set. In short, this is mutually agreed destruction from the Cold War days, because if a bank fails (or 25% of them do), then the systematic risk would be catastrophic. However, each dissenting bank must believe that either a) they will perish anyway, or b) the Troika will bailout Greece in any case.

Variations
The reason that this case is so interesting is that it is difficult to ascertain just who is playing. Let's presume that the 25% represent one side. The question is, just who is on the other? The Troika? The other 75% of the banks? Both at the same time? That is why this situation doesn't exactly fit the Prisoners' Dilemma scenario, but it is instructive because the 25% of banks that dissented may, themselves, not agree on who is the other side of this.

Dear Timmy, Ever Hear of the Glass Houses and Stones Thingy?
One thing that Europeans seems to unilaterally agree upon: Mr Geithner's opinion was not, is not, and won't be welcomed. Now that has implications for the entire system, especially since the US has more than shouldered its share of the burden (failure?) of keeping the system afloat. Untold billions have been lent to the US branches of foreign banks, so in a way, it is peculiar indeed that Mr Geithner is receiving the cold shoulder from the Europeans. Perhaps, there is yet another dimension to this particular instance of the Prisoners' Dilemma, with very nationalistic overtones. Yikes indeed.